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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of Virginia was amended in 2001 to provide: “The people have
a right to hunt, fish, and harvest game, subject to such regulations and restrictions as
the General Assembly may prescribe by general law.”1  Currently, ten states recognize
hunting as a constitutional guarantee, and proposed amendments are pending in other
states.2  The oldest, dating back to the American Revolution, sought to guard against
royal privilege as practiced in England,3 while the newest, adopted in recent decades,
seek to preempt hunting bans sought by “animal rights” zealots.4
Unlike the British tradition of privilege, which denied hunting rights to commoners,
in America the right to hunt was deemed universal, albeit not explicitly expressed in
most constitutions.5  Toward the end of the twentieth century, with increasing urban
1 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
2 See infra App.
3 See Cabot v. Thomas, 514 A.2d 1034,1037 (Vt. 1986) (noting that colonists in what
became Vermont “were well aware of the history of abuses that had occurred in England under
authority of fish and game laws,” and quoting VT. CONST. ch. II, § 67 as recognizing: “The
inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands
they hold, and on other lands not enclosed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable and
other waters (not private property) under proper regulations, to be made and provided by the
General Assembly.”).
4 See, e.g., Moore v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D. Va. 2006) (affirming denial
of injunction against black bear hunt); Fund for Animals v. Mainella, 294 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.D.C. 2003) (affirming denial of injunction against black bear hunt); Mich. Humane Soc’y
v. Natural Res. Comm’n, 404 N.W.2d 757 (Mich. 1987) (holding that the commission may
not allow dove season); Comm’n to Abolish Sport Hunting, Inc. v. Palisades Interstate Park
Comm’n, 444 N.Y.S.2d 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (affirming denial of injunction against
deer hunting); Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 553 A.2d 541 (R.I. 1989)
(holding that the Department may “issue collector’s permit to take wild animals”).
5 Sterling v. Jackson, 37 N.W. 845, 865 (Mich. 1888), captured the American view as
follows:
We can borrow no light, in this discussion, from the English game and
forestry laws, which are not a part of our common law, and which are
repugnant and hostile to the theory of our institutions. The wild game and
fish abounding in our woods and waters have never been the property of
the general government or of the state, in the sense that they were held
the property of the crown in England. No man here is granted special per-
mission by the national or state government to kill game or catch fish
exclusively at certain times or in certain places. Our game and fish laws
are general, and apply to and govern the whole people. The fish of our
waters, and the game of our woods, and the wild birds of the air, belong
to the people, and not to the crown, and should always, when they can be
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and suburban encroachment over rural life and the advent of anti-hunting activism,
a trend arose to adopt guarantees of the right to hunt in state constitutions.6
A survey of the guarantees that have been adopted by different states reveals that
very little case law has been generated.7  While the wording varies, the guarantees
assume that the state legislatures and game departments will regulate hunting consistent
with the principles of sound conservation and game management,8 and the regulations
they adopt are generally upheld.9  To what extent will the usual rules of constitutional
interpretation be applied to the right to hunt?
As a case study, this Article will focus on Virginia’s right to hunt guarantee. 
Debates in the General Assembly over the proposal reveal policy arguments pro and
con.  While no reported judicial decision on the meaning of the guarantee has been
generated, a case called Orion Sporting Group v. Board of Supervisors of Nelson
County10 went to trial and resulted in a thoughtful circuit court opinion on the guar-
antee.  This Article expands on the jurisprudential issues raised in that case as a means
of exploring the potential contours of the right to hunt.
I. THE RIGHT TO HUNT, THEN AND NOW
A. A Historical Perspective
Historically, the English game laws made hunting a monopoly of those privileged
to do so by the Crown, and imposed draconian penalties—sometimes including the
captured or killed without detriment to private rights, be preserved to
the people.
6 See infra App.
7 See, e.g., discussion infra Part I.C.
8 See, e.g., Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res.,
677 N.W.2d 612, 629 (Wis. 2004) (“[T]he 2003 constitution amendment was intended to codify
the common law right to hunt that existed prior to its adoption. . . . The 2003 amendment does
not impose any limitation upon the power of the state or [Department of Natural Resources]
to regulate hunting, other than that any restrictions on hunting must be reasonable.”).
9 Ala. Dog Hunters Ass’n v. State, 893 So. 2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (approv-
ing as constitutional “the Department’s interpretation of those statutes as permitting it to limit,
in the public interest, how certain animals in portions of Alabama may be hunted to certain
methods, in connection with its general regulation of hunting seasons”); Hunters, Anglers &
Trappers Ass’n of Vt., Inc. v. Winooski Valley Park Dist., 913 A.2d 391, 394–95 (Vt. 2006)
(right not implicated where legislature delegated regulatory function to ban hunting in a
district); Hartley Hill Hunt Club v. County Comm’n of Ritchie County, 647 S.E.2d 818,
824–25 (W. Va. 2007) (right to bear arms for lawful hunting held consistent with ban on hunt-
ing on private land on Sundays). Hartley Hill was a challenge supported by the state ACLU,
whose executive director humorously said: “Our state motto may say ‘mountaineers are always
free’ but in Ritchie County they are only free Monday through Saturday.” Press Release, ACLU
of W. Va., ACLU of W. Va. Challenge to Sunday Hunting Prohibition to be Heard in Court
on Wednesday (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.acluwv.org/Newsroom/PressReleases/
10_03_05.htm.
10 68 Va. Cir. 195 (2005).
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death penalty—on commoners for hunting.11  William Blackstone wrote that “the right
of pursuing, taking, and destroying [game] is vested in the king alone, and from him
derived to such of his subjects as have received the grants of a chase, a park, a free
warren, or free fishery.”12  He noted that “a reason oftener meant than avowed by the
makers of forest or game laws” was “[f]or prevention of popular insurrections and
resistance to the government, by disarming the bulk of the people.”13  European feu-
dalism was founded on conquest and the rulers wanted to keep the subjects “in as low
a condition as possible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms.  Nothing could
do this more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting . . . .”14
By contrast, the American colonists were free to hunt.15  The accurate marksman-
ship exhibited by the provincials at the Battle of Bunker Hill “had been derived from
hunting, and the ordinary amusements of sportsmen.  The dexterity which by long
habit they had acquired in hitting beasts, birds, and marks, was fatally applied to the
destruction of British officers.”16
Pennsylvania declared in 1776 “[t]hat the People have a Right to bear Arms for
the Defence of themselves and the State,”17 and also “[t]he inhabitants of this State
shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on
all other lands therein not inclosed.”18  This was a reaction against the English prac-
tices, under which “the freeholders of moderate estates [were] deprived of a natural
right . . . [T]he body of the people kept from the use of guns are utterly ignorant of the
arms of modern war, and the kingdom effectually disarmed, except of the standing
forces . . . .”19
When the federal Constitution was proposed in 1787 without a bill of rights,
Antifederalists from Pennsylvania demanded a declaration in part: “That the people
have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the
United States, or for the purpose of killing game . . . .”20  They also proposed:
11 See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *408–17; P.B. MUNSCHE,
GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS 1671–1831 (1981); E. P. THOMPSON,
WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975).
12 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *409.
13 Id. at *412.
14 Id. at *413.
15 See DAVID RAMSAY, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 190 (Liberty
Classics 1990) (1789).
16 Id.
17 PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (1776).
18 PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 43. William Penn, in The Frame of the Government of the
Province of Pennsylvania in America (1683), had recognized the settlers’ “liberty to fowl and
hunt upon the lands they hold.” WILLIAM PENN AND THE FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA:
1680–1684, at 271 (Jean R. Soderlund ed., 1983).
19 Remarks on the Resolves Published Against the Plan of Government, by a Gentleman
of Neither Party, PA. EVENING POST, Nov. 5, 1776.
20 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 623–24
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
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The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and
hunt in seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other
lands in the United States not enclosed, and in like manner to fish
in all navigable waters, and others not private property, without
being restrained therein by any laws to be passed by the legislature
of the United States.21
Virginia Federalist Alexander White argued against these provisions, which were
“clearly out of the power of Congress” and were proposed “to induce the ignorant
to believe that Congress would have a power over such objects . . . .”22  The modern
regulatory state was not anticipated.
After the proposal in 1789 of what became the Bill of Rights, including the
Second Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear Arms,”23 Samuel Nasson
of Massachusetts wrote his congressman about its effect:
[T]hen their [sic] will be no Dispute Between the people and
rulers in that may be secured the right to keep arms for Common
and Extraordinary Occations [sic] such as to secure ourselves
against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by fowling and for
our Defence against a Common Enemy.24
Writing the first commentaries on the Constitution, Virginia jurist St. George
Tucker said about the Second Amendment and how the right guaranteed therein was
denied by the English game laws: 
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . .  The
right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments
it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the nar-
rowest limits possible.  Wherever standing armies are kept up, and
the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour
or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihi-
lated, is on the brink of destruction.  In England, the people have
been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of preserving
21 Id. at 624.
22 Alexander White, WINCHESTER GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1788, reprinted in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 404 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. II. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Id.
24 Letter from Samuel Nasson to George Thatcher (July 9, 1789), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
260–61 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
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the game: a never failing lure to bring over the landed aristocracy
to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated for
very different purposes.  True it is, their bill of rights seems at first
view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is
confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their condition
and degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of
keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any
farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill
game.  So that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his
house without being subject to a penalty.25
Keeping and bearing arms for hunting was seen as supportive of the “well regu-
lated Militia” the Second Amendment declared as “necessary to the security of a free
State.”26  Dismissing an action for trespass against a deer hunter, the South Carolina
Constitutional Court in 1818 explained:
The right to hunt on unenclosed lands . . . [is] clearly estab-
lished . . . .  Large standing armies are, perhaps, wisely considered
as dangerous to our free institutions; the militia, therefore, neces-
sarily constitutes our greatest security against aggression; our for-
est is the great field in which, in the pursuit of game, they learn
the dexterous use and consequent certainty of firearms, the great
and decided advantages of which have been seen and felt on too
many occasions to be forgotten, or to require a recurrence to.27
25 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
app. at 300 (1803); see Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s Second Amendment:
Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty,” 3 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 120, 126–32 (2007).
Similarly, Henry St. George Tucker, president of the Virginia Supreme Court, wrote:
The right of bearing arms . . . with us is not limited and restrained by an
arbitrary system of game laws, as in England; but is practically enjoyed by
every citizen, and is among his most valuable privileges, since it furnishes
the means of resisting, as a freeman ought, the inroads of usurpation.
1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 43 (1846). While
such criticism reflects American rejection of British practices, the English courts interpreted the
game laws as not prohibiting a gun in the house as long as not used by an unqualified person
for hunting. See, e.g., Rex v. Gardner, 187 Eng. Rep. 1240 (K.B. 1738); see also STEPHEN P.
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
51–53 (1984).
26 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
27 See McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (1818); WILLIAM H. SUMNER, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITIA TO A FREE COMMONWEALTH IN A LETTER . . .
TO JOHN ADAMS . . . WITH HIS ANSWER 39 (1823) (“[I]t is better that the arms should be kept
by the men themselves, at their own dwellings, than in the public arsenals. They thus learn to
take care of them, at least; and as opportunities for hunting and practical shooting offer, they
improve as marksmen.”).
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In District of Columbia v. Heller,28 which invalidated the District’s prohibition on
possession of handguns, the Supreme Court observed that “the Second Amendment’s
prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent
elimination of the militia.  The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the
militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly
thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.”29  The above historical
background demonstrates the interrelatedness of these reasons, particularly that hunting
facilitates the potential for a militia.30
While the militia may have fallen into disuse today, hunters and gun owners remain
a reserve force that could be mobilized in an emergency.  At the beginning of World
War II, the National Guard was drafted and sent overseas.  State protective forces
were called out to guard against sabotage and repel possible invasion.31  The Virginia
Reserve Militia, for instance, consisted of self-armed sportsmen organized locally by
the Advisory Council of Fish and Game Conservation.32  “The accepted plan was to
interest the sportsmen, trap and skeet shots, the hunters and members of the Izaak
Walton League. . . .”33
Today, hunting is a regulated sport which promotes conservation of wildlife under
the public trust doctrine.34  Little thought is given to hunting’s contribution to a repub-
lican polity as conceived by the Founders.  A new elite with the agenda of “animal
rights” who abhor hunting has replaced the Crown as the political force seeking to
repress hunting by the average person.35  In addition, increasing urban and suburban
encroachment on rural life has led to further restrictions on hunting, encouraging the
28 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
29 Id. at 2801.
30 This theme was commonplace in the early Republic. See Stephen P. Halbrook & David
B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787–1823, 7 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 347, 391–98 (1999).
31 See, e.g., Some Chapter History, NEWSLETTER (Arlington-Fairfax Chapter, IWLA,
Centerville, Va.), Nov.–Jan. 2009/2010, at 19.
32 MARVIN W. SCHLEGEL, VIRGINIA ON GUARD: CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND THE STATE
MILITIA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 131 (1949); see also 1945 REP. OF THE ADJUTANT
GEN. OF THE ST. OF VA. 24 (1946) (“Virginia Reserve Militiamen, whose forefathers, the
Minute-men, gained fame in Revolutionary Days, purchased their own forest green uniforms
as well as arms and ammunition.”).
33 1942 REP. OF THE ADJUTANT GEN. OF THE ST. OF VA. 10 (1943); see also Some
Chapter History, supra note 31, at 19.
34 See The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-first Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save
an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235 (1996).
35 See, e.g., Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Hodel, 1988 WL 236545, *2 (D.D.C. 1988) (“With
hunting for deer occurring all over the United States, and having occurred in the past in the
Supawna Refuge as well, the Court cannot find that plaintiff—which relies almost exclusively
on the aesthetic affront from hunting to its members—would be sustaining irreparable injury
in the absence of a preliminary injunction.”).
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overpopulation of deer.36  Localities seeking to remedy such overpopulation by allow-
ing bow hunting have been challenged.37
Some states have responded to the above by adopting constitutional recognition
of the right to hunt.38  Virginia did so by popular vote in the year 2000.39
B. Adoption of Virginia’s Right to Hunt Amendment
During the 1997 race for Attorney General of Virginia, the suggestion arose for an
amendment to the Virginia Constitution that would protect the citizens’ right to hunt.40 
Democratic candidate William D. Dolan III of Arlington proposed the following:
The citizens have a right to hunt, fish, and take game in a safe
manner, subject only to the rights of the owners of affected real
property and to reasonable restrictions related to harvest, licensure,
seasons, limits, and methods, times, and locations of taking game,
and to the health and safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth,
as prescribed by law.41
Dolan accused his Republican rival, State Senator Mark L. Earley of Chesapeake,
of not supporting the right to hunt because Earley’s law firm represented People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).42  Earley’s campaign responded that Dolan
was trying to deflect attention from his prior support for gun control and the National
Rifle Association’s poor rating of his voting record.43  Moreover, Earley had supported
legislation making it unlawful to interfere with fishing, and had not in fact repre-
sented PETA.44
Earley would win the race for Attorney General, but the idea had caught on.45 
Delegate A. Victor Thomas (D-Roanoke) asked the General Assembly’s Division of
36 See, e.g., Glenn Collins, Deer Hunt Goes Ahead After Years of Protest, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2008, at B1.
37 See Kelly v. City of Fort Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (rejecting chal-
lenge to ordinance allowing bow hunting); Gordon v. East Goshen Twp., 592 F. Supp. 2d 828
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (involving a suit that challenges a township initiative to allow bow hunting).
38 See infra App.
39 Id.
40 See Rex Bowman, Dolan: Earley firm serves PETA; But, Republican said to have an





45 Peter Finn, Hager Wins Lt. Gov. Seat in Va. Sweep, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1997, at B1.
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Legislative Services to draft two proposals for a constitutional amendment.46  The
first alternative stated:
The people have a right to hunt, fish, and take game, subject only
to reasonable restrictions, as prescribed by law, related to the rights
of the owners of affected real property, to the methods, times, and
locations of hunting, fishing, and taking game, and to the health
and safety of the people of the Commonwealth.47
The second proposal, which was similar to a constitutional amendment passed in
Alabama,48 stated: “The people shall have the right to hunt and fish in this Common-
wealth in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth.”49  In comparing the two
proposals, their drafter said:
Alternate A is, I think, the stronger proposal because it used the
phrase “subject only to reasonable restrictions” and would give a
basis for challenges to laws that are “unreasonable.”  Alternate B
states the concept, but leaves to statute the expression of specific
rights to hunt and fish.50
During the 1999 General Assembly, Delegate Creigh Deeds (D-Bath County) pro-
posed “Alternate A” as an amendment to the Constitution of Virginia.51  The House
Committee on Rules modified it to read: “The people have a right to hunt, fish, and
harvest game, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly
may prescribe by general law.”52  The amended proposal was agreed to by the entire
Assembly at the Regular Session of 1999 and referred to the 2000 Session.53
When the amendment was brought to the Senate floor in 2000, Senator William
Mims (R-Loudoun County) moved to strike the phrase “and harvest game,” and in-
sert, after the clause providing for regulation by the General Assembly, the additional
clause “and any city or town may prescribe by charter.”54  The Senate rejected both
amendments.55  Regulations would be made by the General Assembly, not localities.
46 Letter from Mary Spain to Hon. Mark L. Earley (Dec. 18, 1997) (on file with Division
of Legislative Services for the Commonwealth of Virginia). This letter is in the legislative file
for the amendment, which is referred to as the legislative “jacket.”
47 Id.
48 The Alabama amendment states: “All persons shall have the right to hunt and fish in this
state in accordance with law and regulations.” ALA. CONST. amend. 597.
49 Letter from Mary Spain to Hon. Mark Earley, supra note 46.
50 Id.
51 H.R.J. Res. 523 (Va. 1999).
52 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
53 In 2000, the proposed amended was introduced as House Joint Resolution 124. H.R.J.
Res. 124 (Va. 2000), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+ful+HJ124.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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Additionally, Senator Janet Howell (D-Fairfax County) proposed an amendment
that would protect the rights to “golf” and “shop,” which the Senate rejected.56  This
appeared calculated to depict a declaration of the right of hunting, fishing, and harvest-
ing game as frivolous.  Yet golf and shopping were not activities that special interest
groups wished to ban, and humans had engaged in hunting since the dawn of humanity.
Howell also proposed inserting after “right” the phrase “to food and shelter and,”
which was offered by the Senate but did not survive.57  She also proposed adding:
“The right set out in this section shall not take precedence over any law, currently in
effect or enacted in the future, for the prevention, deterrence or prosecution of family
abuse or stalking.”58  This floor amendment was withdrawn by the Senate.59
The proposed amendment, which passed in separate legislative sessions,60 was
submitted to the citizens of Virginia.  It was apparently supported by the Virginia
Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, the state agency that regulates hunting.61
The Fund for Animals (the “Fund”) filed suit against the State Board of Elections
(the “Board”), describing it as a “trivialization of the Constitution of Virginia.”62  It
argued that the ballot must include the full text, not just the summary by the Board,
which read: “[s]hall the Constitution of Virginia be amended by adding a provision
concerning the right of the people to hunt, fish, and harvest game?”63  The Fund pre-
dicted that “local authorities would lose the ability to regulate the possession and use
of firearms,” “the validity of protective orders in domestic relations cases restricting
the use and possession of firearms would be called into question,” and that “the consti-
tutionality of firearm possession and use will be at issue which will lead to any number
of conflicts between state and federal restrictions on hunting.”64
The circuit court denied relief, holding that the Board may summarize a constitu-
tional amendment and need not print the full text.65  Denying injunctive relief against





60 Before a constitutional amendment can be enacted in Virginia, the proposed amend-
ment must pass both houses of the General Assembly in two consecutive legislative sessions.
VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
61 See BOARD OF GAME & INLAND FISHERIES MEETING MINUTES, Nov. 29, 2005, http://
www.dgif.virginia.gov/info/board_meetings/112905_Final_Board_Meeting_Minutes.pdf
(noting that new Board member Ward Burton “has donated time to the Department to work
for House Bill 38, the constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to hunt and fish, and
other initiatives beneficial to sportsmen and women”).
62 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 53 Va. Cir. 405,405 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2005).
63 Id. at 406.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 407.
66 Id. at 408.
2010] THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HUNT 207
By popular vote on November 7, 2000, the amendment was ratified and became
effective on January 1, 2001.67  The following analyzes the unreported decision in
Orion Sporting Group v. Board of Supervisors of Nelson County68 and the issues
raised therein as a means to exploring the dimensions of the right.69
C. Testing the Right: Orion Sporting Group v. Nelson County
The Orion Sporting Group, LLC, operated a hunting preserve licensed by the
Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries on its 450-acre estate in a rural part
of Nelson County zoned agricultural.70  Orion also wished to operate a sporting clays
facility on the estate.71  Sporting clays, including trap, skeet, and helice, consists of
shooting at clay pigeons thrown by machines which mimic the flight patterns of game
birds and the movements of small game animals.72  Orion previously operated such
a facility in the county without any controversy.73
The Nelson County Board of Supervisors approved the hunting preserve, but
denied Orion’s application for a conditional use permit for the sporting clays facility.74 
Orion appealed this decision to the circuit court, and also filed a separate action seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that operation of a sporting clays facility, inter alia, is
protected by the constitutional right to hunt.75
The case was assigned to Circuit Court Judge J. Michael Gamble.76  (This author
had the privilege of being engaged by the plaintiff as part of its legal team.)  From
67 Pamela Stallsmith, Hunting, Lottery Measures Approved; Some See Little Practical
Effect, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2000, at A26.
68 68 Va. Cir. 195 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
69 The issue has been raised in at least one other unreported decision. The use of archery
to cull overpopulated deer populations in suburban areas has led to opposition by persons
who object to hunting of any type. In James G. Lewis, et al. v. Reston Association, Cir. Ct. of
Fairfax Co., VA, CL-2007-550, landowners challenged a prohibition imposed by an asso-
ciation under a restrictive covenant against deer hunting with archery equipment on their own
land. ASSOCIATION OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, STAFF REPORT 22 (2008). A preliminary
ruling found that no claim existed under Virginia’s Right to Hunt guarantee because no state
action was involved, but that enforcement by the court of the restrictive covenant would be
state action, and unreasonable restrictions were not enforceable. Lewis v. Reston Ass’n, 2007
WL 4965207 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 2007) (order) (citing, inter alia, Shelly v. Kramer, 334
U.S. 1, 14 (1948)). After trial, the court ruled that plaintiffs were grandfathered under the
covenants and thus could continue deer hunting, and awarded them attorney’s fees of $42,235.
Lewis v. Reston Ass’n, 2008 WL 553667 (Va. Cir. Ct., June 11, 2008) (final order).
70 Petition for Appeal at 4, Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195,
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) (No. 04-0019), petition for appeal denied, No. 05223 (Va. May 4, 2006).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1, 4.
73 See Meeting Minutes of the Bd. of Supervisors 18 (Feb. 4, 2004) (on file with author).
74 Petition for Appeal, supra note 70, at 4.
75 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 66 Va. Cir. 16, 21–22 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004).
76 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
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the beginning, the issue focused on whether sporting clays may be protected by the
right-to-hunt guarantee.77  (At a motions hearing, one of the County Attorneys made
the humorous remark: “Your honor, if sporting clays is hunting, I’d like to know what
their recipe is for clay pigeons!”  This author asked him off the record “So what’s your
recipe for crow?  Crow hunting is hunting.”)
At a three-day trial on the merits, Orion put on evidence from hunting, conserva-
tion, and shooting witnesses, lay and expert, concerning how sporting clays promotes
proficient, safe, and humane hunting.78  The Board argued that persons can learn to hunt
on live game, while conceding that sighting in a gun at the beginning of the season
is part of hunting.79
The parties disputed the meaning of the term “hunting.”  While the Board called
no witnesses, the County’s Director of Planning and Zoning Administrator testified
that hunting is limited to the taking or killing of live animals and birds.80
Orion’s thirteen witnesses described a diverse array of hunting forms practiced in
Virginia.81  Hunting may include the use of simulated and artificial game, and does not
always involve the direct pursuit of live animals.82  Moreover, sporting clays enhances
a hunter’s proficiency, safety, and humaneness.83
Fox hunts involve chasing a real fox or, where there is loss of habitat, pursuing a
scent left by dragging a bag.84  Falconry involves hunting live or simulated prey, such
as a lure.85  Hound hunting involves pursuit of a live animal, or pursuit of the trail left
by a scent bag.86
Wing (bird) shooters had abundant game birds to hunt in Virginia in the 1960s,
but game birds in the wild have declined.87  Wing shooters may now hunt at preserves,
where pheasants are tossed into the air by handlers, or placed in fields to be flushed
by dogs.88  Sporting clays offers similar targets which replicate the flight patterns of
live birds.89  The hunting experience is virtually the same.90
An environmental psychologist testified that as man has evolved, today hunting
is characterized by anticipation, a sense of pursuit, a weapon, and a goal, which “does
77 Id.
78 Petition for Appeal, supra note 70, at 4.
79 Id. at 5.
80 Deposition of Fred Boger at 8, 22, 26, Orion, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (No. 04-0019) (on file
with author).
81 Petition for Appeal, supra note 70, at 4.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Transcript of Record at 468, Orion, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (No. 04-0019) (on file with author).
85 Id. at 428.
86 Id. at 445–48.
87 Id. at 396, 401.
88 Id. 60–63, 68–70.
89 Id. at 43–47.
90 Id. at 387–89.
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not require the killing of an animal to be hunting.”91  A hunting journalist found no
significant difference between sporting clays and live dove hunting.92
Morris Peterson, Orion CEO, testified that “my preference in hunting today are
clay targets and Helice because, one, I don’t enjoy cleaning birds, and I will not kill
anything that we’re not going to eat.”93
The Board’s policy was that one can learn to hunt by practicing on wild animals. 
As stated by the County’s Director of Planning and Zoning Administrator, “Generally,
you can learn out in the field to hunt during hunting season.”94  However, the Board
did consider sighting in and practice to be hunting during a brief time period each
year.  Asked whether the County would “allow both sighting in of rifles and hunter
safety training to be conducted on property as part of a hunting use of property,” he
responded “[i]f it’s at the beginning of the hunting season.”95
An expert who trains state game departments on the use of sporting clays to make
wing shooters more proficient and reduce the incidence of wounded birds addressed
“the ethical question of practicing on live game. . . .  That just is so beyond the evolv-
ing ethic of hunting that we couldn’t even begin to suggest that.  There is no way you
can shoot enough live game birds to develop that level of proficiency without an in-
credible wing loss.”96  An instructor for the Virginia Hunter Education Program and
the 4-H Shooting Education Program testified about the need to teach youngsters safe
and proficient shooting skills before hunting live game.97
An expert who had insured just under a thousand shooting preserves testified that
sporting clays are found at 80–90% of game preserves.98  Becoming a competent
bird hunter required far more than the safety warmup with sporting clays that Orion
conducted before pheasant hunts.99
At the end of the trial, the circuit judge viewed the Orion Estate.  (This author
was present at the judge’s observation.)  He observed demonstrations of simulated
hunting with sporting clays, and live hunting in which pheasants flew in patterns similar
to those in sporting clays.  In one scenario, clay pigeons were thrown from a ridge and
shot from positions below the ridge.  Then pheasants were released from the ridge and
shot from the same positions.  In another scenario, clay pigeons were thrown upward
from a corn field and shot, after which hunting dogs were released to cause pheasants
in the field to fly, and the pheasants were then dispatched.
91 Id. at 343; see also JAMES A. SWAN, IN DEFENSE OF HUNTING 144 (1995) (describing
why people hunt in modern times).
92 Transcript of Record, supra note 84, at 416–17.
93 Id. at 490.
94 Deposition of Fred Boger, supra note 80, at 18.
95 Transcript of Record, supra note 84, at 143–44.
96 Id. at 221–22.
97 Id. at 164–69.
98 Id. at 26–63, 276–77.
99 Id. at 526–29.
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Circuit Judge Gamble issued a letter opinion ruling in favor of the Board and
against Orion.100  The court recognized that “the constitutional right to hunt, fish, and
harvest game under the Constitution of Virginia is a fundamental right.”101  However,
it relied on criminal cases which gave the term “hunt” a narrow definition, and held
that “the word ‘hunt’ in its plain, obvious, and common sense means the pursuit of
game.  Shooting sporting clays is not the pursuit of game.”102
The court rejected the concept that the hunting of “simulated game” to learn to
hunt real game properly is implied in the constitutional right to hunt.103  “This argu-
ment fails because the commonly understood definition of the word ‘hunt’ does not
include proficiency, safety, or the humane hunting of game.”104  Contrariwise, the
court found that under the zoning ordinance “the use of sporting clays for warm-ups
and safety tests in conjunction with hunts of live animals on the hunting preserve is
an accessory use.”105
Orion filed a petition for appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court, which declined
to review the decision.106
The following explains the circuit court’s thoughtful opinion in more detail and sets
forth the arguments Orion made in that court and in seeking review by the Virginia
Supreme Court.  Since the Supreme Court denied the appeal,107 the opinion and these
arguments remain untested by appellate review.  In the absence of precedent on the
right to hunt guarantee, this analysis seeks to contribute to a jurisprudence of that right
by applying ordinary principles of constitutional interpretation to the subject.
II. IS OPERATION OF A SHOOTING FACILITY PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO HUNT AND HARVEST GAME?
A. As a Constitutional Right, the Right to Hunt Must Be Broadly Construed
It is well established that “the Constitution ought to receive not a strict and
narrow, but a liberal and reasonable construction.”108  The Constitution must not be
construed with “such rigor and inflexibility” that “we not only violate accepted prin-
ciples of interpretation, but we destroy the rights which the Constitution intended
to guard.”109
100 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195, 195 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
101 Id. at 197.
102 Id. at 198–99.
103 Id. at 199.
104 Id. at 198–99.
105 Id. at 202.
106 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 052233 (Va. May 4, 2006) (denying
petition for rehearing).
107 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 052233 (Va. Feb. 24, 2006) (denying
appeal).
108 In re Broadus, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 779, 786 (1880).
109 Moore v. Pullem, 142 S.E. 415, 421 (Va. 1928) (citation omitted).
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Does the right to hunt protect activities which promote hunter safety and profi-
ciency?110  As in other contexts, “[t]his constitutional protection must not be inter-
preted in a hostile or niggardly spirit.”111  “To view a particular provision of the Bill
of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it.  This is
to disrespect the Constitution.”112
The Orion opinion recognized that “the constitutional right to hunt, fish, and
harvest game under the Constitution of Virginia is a fundamental right.”113  That rec-
ognition reflected precedent: “A fundamental right is one explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution.”114  The right to hunt, being explicitly protected by the
Constitution, is a fundamental right.  The “least restrictive alternative” must be fol-
lowed when “state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights
or liberties.”115
“When . . . a statute affects a fundamental right . . ., its constitutionality will be
judged by the ‘strict scrutiny’ test.”116  Under the strict scrutiny test, the government
must show that (1) it has a “compelling interest in restricting” the activity,117 (2) “the
restrictions further such an interest,”118 and (3) “a more narrowly drawn restriction will
frustrate its interest.”119  While this test may not apply to action by the Common-
wealth—the right being “subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General
Assembly may prescribe”120—it would seem to apply to action by counties and cities,
not to mention litigious “animal rights” activists.
By analogy, the right to free speech protects much more than words; it protects
expression of all kinds.  Such expression may range from flag burning to theater to
video games.121  Similarly, the right to hunt protects a broad range of activities.
110 Just the day before oral argument before the Virginia Supreme Court on the petition
for appeal in the Orion case, a tragic fatality was reported from Stafford County in goose
hunting season. Boy, 7, Dies After Hunting Accident, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at B3.
Days before that, Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally wounded another hunter. Cheney
Accidentally Shoots Fellow Hunter, CNN.com, Feb. 13, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/
POLITICS/02/12/cheney/index.html?iref=allsearch (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
111 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
112 Id. at 428–29.
113 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195, 197 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
114 Ballard v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 284 (Va. 1984) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973)).
115 County Bd. v. Richards, 231 S.E.2d 231, 234 (Va. 1977) (citation omitted).
116 Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (Va. 1990).
117 Adams Outdoor Adver. v. City of Newport News, 373 S.E.2d 917, 923 (Va. 1988).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
121 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag burning); S.E. Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1975) (protecting theater, which “mixes speech with live
action or conduct”); Am. Amusement Machine Ass’n. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th
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B. Is the Right to Hunt Broader Than the Right to Pursue and Harvest Game?
The Constitution recognizes that “the people” have a “right to hunt,” a right to
“fish,” and a right to “harvest game.”122  The “right to hunt,” unlike the right to
“harvest,” is not restricted to game.  Not only are those activities listed separately,
but their separation by the term “fish” makes clear that the term “game” refers only
to the term “harvest.”  The term “game” does not relate back to or limit the “right to
hunt,” which may include activities besides the taking of game.  In short, the people
have a “right to hunt,” and not just a “right to hunt game.”
Use of the terms “hunt” and “harvest game” indicates that these words have mean-
ings that are divergent.123  Since the right to pursue game is implied by the right to
harvest game, limiting the “right to hunt” to that activity would render its separate men-
tion meaningless.  “Under settled rules of statutory construction, legislative enactments
‘should be interpreted, if possible, in a manner which gives meaning to every word.’”124
The above distinction is illustrated by a historian’s comment that, as a youngster,
Thomas Jefferson was taught both how to “fire his gun” and to press through the hills
“in pursuit of deer and wild turkeys.”125  Had an explicit right to hunt been needed in
those days, presumably it would have accorded protection to learning how to shoot pro-
ficiently and safely.  Otherwise no one would have ever harvested any deer or turkeys.
Narrowing the general term “hunt” to nothing more than the specific term “harvest
game” would “restrict the meaning of the general words by the more specific and par-
ticular description which follows,” the effect of which would be “not to restrict the
meaning of the general words, but to render them mere surplusage, or without any
meaning.”126
The legislative history of the constitutional amendment further clarifies that the
right to “hunt” was not intended to be limited to the right to “hunt game.”  When the
proposal was brought to the Senate floor in 2000, Senator William Mims moved to
strike the phrase “and harvest game,” so that the opening clause would have read
simply: “The people have a right to hunt and fish . . . .”  The Senate rejected the
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 462 (2001) (protecting video games in which players shoot
at monsters).
122 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
123 For an example of the usage of the term “harvest,” see Va. Code § 28.2-226(B) (“No
license shall be required of an oyster grounds leaseholder, or other person authorized or
employed by a leaseholder, to harvest oysters or clams from the leasehold.”).
124 Roberts v. Bd. of Supervisors, 453 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va. 1995) (citations omitted). “It
would be absurd to conclude that the legislature would say the same thing twice in one statu-
tory provision. . . . The rules of statutory interpretation argue against reading any legislative
enactment in a manner that will make a portion of it useless, repetitious, or absurd.” Jones v.
Conwell, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (Va. 1984).
125 1 HENRY S. RANDALL, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14 (1865).
126 Stephen Putney Shoe Co. v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co., 81 S.E. 93, 97 (Va. 1914).
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motion.127  This episode in the amendment’s drafting history again reinforces that the
right to “hunt” and the right to “harvest game” are separate and distinct rights.
A constitutional guarantee that “the people have the right” to hunt guarantees
the broad right to engage in activities associated with hunting, which extend beyond
merely the taking of live game.  Focusing only on the literal act of harvesting live game
ignores the right of hunters to enjoy the activities, interests and values involved in the
hunting experience, including the right to hunt simulated game.
Moreover, the existence of a right also includes the option not to exercise that
right.128  Some wish to exercise the right to hunt but not the right to harvest game. 
A narrow view prevents persons from exercising the right to hunt unless they are
pursuing and harvesting live game.
The right to hunt is in Article XI of the Constitution, which concerns “Conser-
vation.”129  While § 4’s guarantee of hunting as a “right of the people” makes that activ-
ity an individual right just like other such liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,130
its placement in the article on Conservation highlights the policy of the Common-
wealth to promote and regulate hunting and the harvesting of game for conservation
purposes.131
The circuit court characterized the right to hunt as a “grant of interest in the land
itself” or a “profit à prendre.”132  While not decisive to the issues here, the right to hunt
should be analyzed under the public trust doctrine, having roots in Roman law and the
Magna Carta.  As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court over a century ago:
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common prop-
erty in game rests have undergone no change, the development
of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that the
power or control lodged in the State, resulting from this common
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government,
as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for
the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or
127 See Virginia General Assembly Legislative Information System, May 18, 2010, http://
leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+amd+HJ124ASR.
128 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“Freedom of
association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”) (citation omitted).
129 See VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (describing the conservation policy); id. § 2 (describing
the natural resources and historical sites); id. § 3 (describing the preservation of oyster beds).
130 See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“[T]he right of the people peaceably to assemble”);
id. § 13 (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms”).
131 See 2 A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1151,
1154 (1974) (noting that Article XI establishes a public trust in the natural resources of the
State).
132 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195, 197 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
214 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:197
for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the
public good.133
Sporting clays offers a hunting experience which promotes conservation by advanc-
ing ethical hunting and harvesting of game.134  A narrow view discourages practice
and proficiency, and encourages hunters to pursue and shoot at live game without ade-
quate preparation and training.135  To the contrary, the constitutional guarantee must
be understood in a manner to further its dual purposes of protecting a broad “right of
the people” and of promoting conservation.
III. DOES THE RIGHT TO HUNT INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO HUNT PROFICIENTLY,
SAFELY, AND HUMANELY?
A. Constitutional Rights Include Both Core and Auxiliary Rights
Sporting clays enables the hunter to become more proficient, safe, and humane
when hunting and harvesting live game.136  A constitutional guarantee protects activ-
ities that are ordinary and necessary to exercising the core right.  A “right” would be
meaningless if one could not take the steps necessary to exercise it in a substantial
manner.  The “right to hunt” describes a continuum of activities that may, but need
not, lead to the actual harvesting of game.
The Orion court decided that learning to hunt proficiently, safely, and humanely,
such as through sporting clays, is not implied in or incident to the right to hunt.137  It
stated: “This argument fails because the commonly understood definition of the word
‘hunt’ does not include proficiency, safety, or the humane hunting of game.”138
Thus, the court narrowly equated the “right to hunt” with the specific act of hunt-
ing live game, ignoring that a constitutional right is an umbrella for exercise of activ-
ities that are necessary to exercise the core, primary activity.  If the right to hunt “does
not include proficiency, safety, or the humane hunting of game,”139 then this “right”
may be exercised only in its most minimal, crude form—incompetent, unsafe, and
inhumane hunting.
133 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979). Hughes did not disturb the above principle: “[T]he general rule we adopt in
this case makes ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce
Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals under-
lying the 19th-century legal fiction of state ownership.” Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335–36.
134 See Orion, 68 Va. Cir. at 202.
135 See id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 199.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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Every constitutional right includes incidents which are fairly implied in the right
expressly recognized.140  “Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be
less secure.”141
This principle was well recognized by Blackstone, who stated about “the principal
absolute rights which appertain to every Englishman”:142
But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained, and pro-
tected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had pro-
vided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment.  It has
therefore established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of
the subject, which serve principally as outworks or barriers to pro-
tect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.143
An analogy may be gleaned from the incidents protected by the right to keep and
bear arms, which is closely related and essential to the right to hunt.144  In an 1871
decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court explained:
What, then, is involved in this right of keeping arms?  It necessarily
involves the right to purchase and use them in such a way as is
usual, or to keep them for the ordinary purposes to which they are
adapted; and as they are to be kept, evidently with a view that
the citizens making up the yeomanry of the land, the body of the
militia, shall become familiar with their use in times of peace, that
they may the more efficiently use them in times of war; then the
right to keep arms for this purpose involves the right to practice
their use, in order to attain to this efficiency.145
140 See Robert v. City of Norfolk, 49 S.E.2d 697, 704 (Va. 1948) (invalidating ordinance
which “permits the punishment of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of
a free press” (emphasis added)).
141 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965) (holding that free speech and
press include “the right to distribute, the right to receive, . . . and freedom to teach”). “[The]
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.” Id. at 484.
142 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140.
143 Id.
144 VA. CONST. art. I, § 13, provides in part “[t]hat a well regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, there-
fore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed . . . .” See generally
Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to Keep Arms: Reflections
on the Bills of Rights of Virginia, West Virginia, and the United States, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(1993) (discussing the arms guarantees of the United States, Virginia, and West Virginia).
145 Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178 (Tenn. 1871) (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, Hill v. State, noted the objective of a “well regulated militia,” explained:
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In 1964, the Virginia General Assembly resolved that “many citizens of this
Commonwealth who own and enjoy the use of firearms are greatly disturbed by the
proposals of certain groups to regulate and restrict gun ownership,” and noted the
necessity of “proper training in the safe and effective use of firearms . . . .”146  Train-
ing in safety and proficiency are inherent in any firearms-related activity and thus are
within protected rights.
A similar issue arose in a prosecution in Arizona of a licensed hunter for trespass-
ing on state land.147  The prohibition did not apply to a person “lawfully taking wild-
life.”148  Arizona Attorney General Opinion No. 76-4 stated: “A license issued by Game
and Fish carries with it the State’s permission to access State trust land for the purpose
of hunting and fishing but does not include any other ‘recreational’ uses.”149  At trial,
the defendant testified that he relied on his hunting license while shooting on such
land.150  The Arizona Superior Court reversed his conviction on the following basis:
“Hunting” involves more than the moment in which an animal is
killed by a hunter.  Sighting in a rifle for accuracy before seeking
game is an integral part of safe and responsible hunting, as is scout-
ing for game, and various other activities in anticipation of taking
wildlife; these activities are not “other recreational uses.”  To limit
hunters’ access to the specific act of shooting at an animal would
be to discourage safe and humane hunting.  The license held by
Appellant essentially granted him an easement for the purpose of
hunting.  Though “other recreational uses” are excluded, the law
recognizes that any easement encompasses activities reasonably
necessary and appurtenant to accomplish the purpose of the ease-
ment.  As a possessor of a valid Arizona hunting license, Appellant
was lawfully and with right shooting on state trust land.151
To acquire this skill and this familiarity, the words “bear arms” must
include the right to load them and shoot them and use them as such
things are ordinarily used, so that the “people” will be fitted for defend-
ing the state when its needs demand; and when the constitution grants
to the general assembly the right to prescribe the manner in which arms
may be borne, it grants the power to regulate the whole subject of using
arms, provided the regulation does not infringe that use of them which
is necessary to fit the owner of them for a ready and skillful use of them
as a militiaman. Any restriction which interferes with this is void, whether
it relates to the carrying them about the person, or to the place or time
of bearing them.
Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 480–81 (1874).
146 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF VA., 250–51, 472 (1964).
147 State v. John Lazzeroni, No. CR-65983 (Az. Sup. Ct. Oct. 7, 1999) (on file with author).
148 Id. at 4.
149 1990 Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen. 73, 1990 WL 484063, *1 (1990).
150 Lazzeroni, No. CR-65983, at 4.
151 Id. at 4–5.
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In Orion, the Board of Supervisors argued that the view that activities preceding
the actual hunt are protected would “extend constitutional protection to shopping for
shotgun shells and hunting clothing, and leafing through Cabela’s magazine.”152  While
the court did not opine on that argument, it could be noted that if those activities are
not protected, then the Board could ban shotgun shells and other items necessary for
hunting, as long as it did not ban the actual pursuit of game.  Hunting would be im-
possible without ammunition and commercial sources for hunting products.153  As held
about a related right, “the right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right . . . to
purchase and provide ammunition suitable for such arms . . . .”154
The constitutional guarantee protects activities that are ordinary and necessary
to hunting and harvesting game.  If a locality banned buckshot, dove loads, or other
shotgun shells, would that not violate the guarantee?  Given the right to hunt, could
a locality ban hunting clothing such as blaze orange or camouflage coats?  Could it
ban hunting catalogs without violating the right to hunt, not to mention the right to a
free press?
For the above reasons, the right to hunt and to harvest game includes the right to
offer and receive training and practice which makes one proficient, safe, and humane
in the hunting and harvesting of game.  The constitutional right includes incidents
fairly within the protection of the guarantee.
B. The Public Policy of the Commonwealth Promotes Firearm Safety and
Shooting Facilities for Hunting Purposes
The right to hunt is “subject to such regulations” as the General Assembly may
prescribe.155  The General Assembly has enacted laws which promote firearm safety
and training, shooting ranges, and game preserves.156  While the infrastructure for hunt-
ing activities is left primarily to private initiative, these enactments indicate that the
public policy of the Commonwealth recognizes that the right to hunt includes activities
which make hunters proficient, safe, and humane.
The functions of the Board of Game and Inland Fisheries illustrate the close re-
lation between shooting facilities, hunting, and conservation.  The Board is directed
to “[c]onduct operations for the preservation and propagation of game birds, game
152 Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Memorandum at 10–11, Orion Sporting
Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195(Va. Cir. Ct. June 3, 2005) (Nos. 04-0019, 04-
0020) (on file with author).
153 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965) (holding that one has a right
to “shop for” and acquire the objects necessary to exercise a primary constitutional right: “The
right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry, freedom
of thought, and freedom to teach . . . . Without those peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure.” (emphasis added)).
154 Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
155 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
156 VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-300.2 (2010) (establishing a hunter education program).
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animals, fish and other wildlife,”157 as well as to “acquire lands and waters for game
and fish refuges, preserves or public shooting and fishing . . . .”158
To obtain a hunting license, one must either complete a hunter education program
or have had a prior license.159  The Department of Game and Inland Fisheries “shall pro-
vide for a course of instruction in hunter safety, principles of conservation, and sports-
manship,”160 and shall cooperate with organizations with such objectives.161  Hunter
education may involve shooting practice.162
The right to hunt justifies not just the minimal hunter education course required
by law, but also more advanced training.  The Department itself sponsors hunting
workshops which include shooting practice.163  The hunter education program is just
a beginning, and practice and proficiency are necessary to learn to hunt live game.  The
Commonwealth is not expected to provide facilities and training to a hunter to learn
to hunt any more than it hands out a free shotgun to every hunter.  Shooting facilities
serve the Commonwealth’s public policy objectives to promote hunter safety, principles
of conservation, and sportsmanship.164  This would particularly be the case for a shoot-
ing preserve licensed by the Department of Game and Inland Fisheries.165  A shooting
facility would allow hunters to practice the efficient and humane taking of game.
The fact that the hunting preserve is a commercial venture does not change the use
as a hunting use protected by the right to hunt.  Status as a licensed shooting preserve
means that “the licensee and such other persons as he may designate, because of pay-
ment of fees or otherwise, may hunt on the licensed premises, and shoot . . . any game
birds or animals of the species licensed.”166  Similarly, the right to hunt includes the
right to train hunters to hunt and the right to be so trained.
In sum, the public policy of the Commonwealth is to promote shooting activ-
ities and facilities which make hunters proficient, safe, and humane.  The pertinent
157 § 29.1-103.3 (2010).
158 § 29.1-103.4; see also § 29.1-106 (allowing the Board to establish “public shooting and
fishing preserves”). In addition to hunting, Virginia Wildlife Management Areas offer shooting
ranges, including rifle sighting-in ranges, clay-bird shotgun ranges, and elevated stations for
archery practice. See, e.g., Amelia WMA, Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries,




162 See, e.g., § 29.1-300.3 (noting that the cost of instruction may include range fees and
ammunition).
163 See, e.g., Outreach Programs and Events, Virginia Department of Game and Inland
Fisheries, http://www.dgif.virginia.gov/events/descriptions.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2010)
(offering courses on “shotgun, rifle, archery, hunting techniques for game species”).
164 See Avery v. Beale, 80 S.E.2d 584, 592 (Va. 1954) (noting that game law is “enacted for
the conservation of waterfowl, the protection and safety of those engaged in shooting them,
and for the promotion of better sport and recreation.”).
165 See VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-600 (2010) (providing for licenses for shooting preserves).
166 § 29.1-604.
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regulations enacted by the General Assembly demonstrate that the right to hunt
protects such activities and facilities.
C. The Constitutional Right is Not Confined to Narrow Definitions in the Game
Code Which Create Crimes and Which Must be Narrowly Construed
To define the word “hunt,” the Orion court relied on criminal cases involving
hunting without a license.167  The court also relied on dictionaries in support of the
same restrictive definitions.168  The court then held that “the word ‘hunt’ in its plain,
obvious, and common sense means the pursuit of game.  Shooting sporting clays is
not the pursuit of game.”169
However, the words of a criminal statute are defined narrowly, while constitu-
tional rights are construed broadly.170  The Commonwealth has an interest in defining
hunting as the pursuit of live game for conservation purposes only.  Moreover, a bare
definition of the word “hunt” is not dispositive of the meaning of the “right to hunt”
and of the incidental or auxiliary rights it protects.
In Commonwealth v. Bailey,171 which involved the crime of hunting fox without
a license, the Virginia Supreme Court quoted definitions of hunting such as “the act
of pursuing and taking wild animals; the chase.”172  Even then, the court also offered
broader definitions, such as “to follow with dogs or guns for sport or exercise.”173  But
Bailey involved the meaning of “hunt” under a criminal statute, and “[i]t is a cardinal
principle of law that penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the [Common-
wealth].”174  The full scope of a constitutional guarantee may not be limited to the
narrow use of terms in a criminal statute.
The game code does define “hunting,” but the definition is restricted as follows:
“As used in and for the purposes of [Title 29.1] only, or in any of the regulations of the
Board, unless the context clearly requires a different meaning.”175  In language identical
to what existed when the right-to-hunt guarantee was adopted, that section provides:
“Hunting and trapping” includes the act of or the attempted act of
taking, hunting, trapping, pursuing, chasing, shooting, snaring or
netting birds or animals, and assisting any person who is hunting,
trapping or attempting to do so regardless of whether birds or ani-
mals are actually taken; however, when hunting and trapping are
167 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195, 198 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
168 Id. at 198–99.
169 Id. at 199.
170 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 n.14 (1956) (citation omitted) (instruct-
ing that the Constitution should be read broadly).
171 97 S.E. 774, 774 (Va. 1919).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 774–75.
174 Wade v. Commonwealth, 116 S.E.2d 99, 103 (Va. 1960).
175 VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-100 (2010) (emphasis added).
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allowed, reference is made to such acts as being conducted by
lawful means and in a lawful manner.  The Board of Game and
Inland Fisheries may authorize by regulation the pursuing or chas-
ing of wild birds or wild animals during any closed hunting season
where persons have no intent to take such birds or animals.176
The definition is narrow as it applies to the criminal prohibition on hunting with-
out a license and other crimes, reflecting the Commonwealth’s interest in the conser-
vation of wildlife.177  Because wildlife is not harvested while hunting simulated game,
it is not included in the definition of “hunting” for purposes of defining crimes.178
The game code recognizes that hunting need not involve the taking of live game
and is an art that can be practiced.  As seen above, the statutory definition itself refers
to the pursuit of game in the closed season when persons have no intent to harvest
game.179  Field trials with dogs need not involve the shooting of game.180  Foxes may
be hunted on horseback without firearms.181  The law prohibits shooting at live pigeons
as a form of target practice,182 obviously preferring the shooting of clay pigeons for
target practice.  Hunting is not restricted to pursuing game.183
176 Id.; see also 1990 Va. Acts 371; 2002 Va. Acts 157. As noted, hunting includes
“assisting” another who “is hunting” in the present tense. In a broader sense, and not for pur-
poses of the criminal provisions regarding hunting, a person operating a shooting facility would
be “assisting” a person who “will be hunting,” in the future tense, by enhancing the hunter’s
proficiency. The constitutional right to hunt is broad enough to include activities which directly
assist hunters.
177 See VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-300 (“It shall be unlawful to hunt . . . without first obtaining
a license”); § 29.1-335 (making hunting without license a Class 3 misdemeanor); § 29.1-519(F)
(making hunting with unauthorized weapons a Class 3 misdemeanor); § 29.1-521 (making
it unlawful to hunt on Sunday, to hunt over the bag limit, or to hunt other than as permitted
by law); § 29.1-521.1.A (making it unlawful “to willfully and intentionally impede the lawful
hunting . . . of wild birds or wild animals.”).
178 “Hunting” is defined differently for various statutory purposes. See, e.g., § 29.1-526
(“For the purpose of this section, the terms ‘hunt’ and ‘trap’ shall not include the necessary
crossing of highways for the bona fide purpose of going into or leaving a lawful hunting or
trapping area.”).
179 § 29.1-100.
180 See § 29.1-422 (authorizing the Board to “grant permits to bona fide field trial clubs and
associations to hold field trials with dogs . . . . If wild game is to be shot over or in front of dogs
engaged in such field trials, the person actually shooting must have a license”).
181 See § 29.1-300.1(C) (noting that the hunter-education requirement for a hunting license
“shall not apply to persons while on horseback hunting foxes with hounds but without
firearms”).
182 VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6573 (2010) provides in part: “Live pigeons or other birds or fowl
shall not be kept or used for the purpose of a target, or to be shot at either for amusement or as
a test of skill in marksmanship. . . . Nothing contained herein shall apply to the shooting of
wild game.”
183 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56.1(B) (punishing reckless handling of firearms “while
the person is engaged in hunting, trapping or pursuing game”) (emphasis added).
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Finally, constitutional rights, especially the auxiliary rights that may be neces-
sary to exercise core rights, may not be reduced to bare dictionary definitions.  As
explained by the U.S. Supreme Court:
[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical for-
mulas having their essence in their form; they are organic, living
institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is
vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the
words in a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line
of their growth.184
No court would hold that the government could ban electronic media on the basis
of the argument that the First Amendment guarantees only a right to a free press, and
the dictionary definition of the term “press” is “short for printing press.”185
In sum, the right to hunt provides an umbrella of activities, such as shooting
practice, which make it possible to hunt and to harvest game proficiently, safely, and
humanely.  Constitutional rights are not and have never been limited to definitions
found in criminal codes or dictionaries.
IV. IF WARM-UP SHOOTING AND SAFETY CHECKS ARE ACCESSORY USES TO
HUNTING, DOES THE RIGHT TO HUNT INCLUDE PRACTICE SHOOTING?
The extent to which practice shooting may be considered as an adjunct right to the
primary right to hunt is suggested in the Orion court’s analysis of whether sporting
clays is an accessory use in an agricultural district under the zoning ordinance.186  While
the court ruled that sporting clays is not generally an accessory use, its discussion bears
on the issue of whether the use of sporting clays is what could be called an “accessory”
right to the primary right to hunt.187
Specifically, the court recognized that practice shooting for safety and warmup is
part of a specific hunt.188  That raises the issue of whether a basis exists to limit safety
to the time period just before an actual hunt, or to only allow a warmup just before a
hunt but not to allow practice at other times.
184 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 n.14 (1956) (citation omitted).
185 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1066 (3d Coll. ed. 1991).
186 Nelson County, Va. Zoning Ordinance § 4-1-12 (2010) permits, by right, “accessory
uses” on land that is zoned as an Agricultural District A-1, like the Orion property. An
“accessory use” is defined as “a subordinate use . . . customarily incidental to and located
upon the same lot occupied by the main use or building.” NELSON COUNTY, VA. ZONING
ORDINANCE § 2.2 (2010).
187 Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195, 195 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
188 Id. at 202.
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As the court noted, “John Long, an insurance agent who specializes in insurance
for hunting preserves, testified that approximately 80 to 90 percent of hunting preserves
nationally have a sporting clays facility.”189  The court remarked “[a]t first blush, it
seems that the sporting clays facility is a subordinate use customarily incidental to
the hunting preserve.”190
However, the court decided that sporting clays would be the main activity, and
hence Orion was not entitled to engage in that activity as a matter of right.191  First, it
noted that the shooting preserve license allowed hunting game only eight months of
the year, but the clays facility could operate all twelve months.192  However, year-round
practice would seem to make the actual hunting of game safer and more proficient.
Second, the court noted evidence that sporting clays was useful for attracting
women shooters and offered an alternative to those who did not wish to engage in the
“blood sports.”193  Yet presumably, some such persons would eventually engage in
the hunting of live game.  Some persons practice an activity more than others before
engaging in the actual activity.
Third, the court noted testimony that the sporting estate would not be feasible with-
out the sporting clays course.194  Yet the court had recognized previously that hunt-
ing preserves generally have sporting clays.195  It would be no surprise that a hunting
preserve with inadequate facilities for practice and safety training would not be a com-
mercial success.  A sporting clays facility is an integral part of a hunting preserve.
An Indiana appellate court held that a skeet range and shooting range were acces-
sory uses to a recreational country home with 40 acres.196  The Orion court sought to
distinguish that case because the recreational use there occurred primarily on week-
ends.197  Yet the Indiana court held that the result would be the same even if the skeet
range was used every day, as the issue was “the nature of the use, not the degree of
intensity with which the use is pursued.”198
An instructive analogy may be made between sporting clays as an auxiliary right
to the primary constitutional right to hunt and sporting clays as an accessory use to
the main hunting use under a zoning ordinance.  The Orion court itself found that a
limited amount of sporting clays is an accessory use to hunting as follows:
I do find that the use of sporting clays for warm-ups and safety
tests in conjunction with hunts of live animals on the hunting
189 Id. at 200.





195 Id. at 200.
196 Boone County Area Plan Comm’n v. Kennedy, 560 N.E.2d 692, 697 (Ind. App. 1990).
197 Orion, 68 Va. Cir. at 202.
198 Kennedy, 560 N.E.2d at 696 n.2.
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preserve is an accessory use.  The facts establish that this limited
use of sporting clays is customary to allow a hunter to warm-up
prior to engaging in a hunt of wild game and for the staff and
guides to evaluate the proficiency of the hunter for safety pur-
poses.  Thus, and for this limited purpose, the shooting of sport-
ing clays is allowed as an accessory use.  Accordingly, while a
sporting clays facility is not an accessory use under the Nelson
County Zoning Ordinance to a hunting preserve, shooting of
sporting clays, or for that matter skeet or trap, is subordinate and
incidental to the hunting preserve for purposes of warm-ups and
safety evaluations.199
If shooting sporting clays to warm-up for a hunt and to allow a safety check are
part of hunting at the time of a specific hunt, so too, it would seem, are practice and
safety training at other times.  One plays basketball not just during the warm-up be-
fore a game, but also on practice days.  And if safety is a legitimate part of hunting just
before an actual hunt, it is equally legitimate at other times.  In short, given that pro-
ficiency and safety are proper objectives of a specific hunt, promotion of these same
objectives at other times appears to be encompassed in the right to hunt.
V. DO LOCAL RULES RUN AFOUL OF THE GUARANTEE’S RESERVATION OF
REGULATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY?
A. The Right to Hunt is Subject to Regulation by the General Assembly, Which
Has Authorized Counties to Regulate Only in Narrow Circumstances
The right to hunt can only be regulated or restricted by the General Assembly.200 
In Orion, the County’s Director of Planning and Zoning testified to the Board’s restric-
tion that one must “learn out in the field to hunt during hunting season.”201  However,
the Board allowed “both sighting in of rifles and hunter safety training to be conducted
on property as part of a hunting use of property,” only “if it’s at the beginning of the
hunting season.”202  Sighting in at the beginning of the season is allowed because it is
“ordinarily, customarily part of a hunting use,” i.e., “of the hunting of live game,” but
not so “if you’re shooting at targets outside the hunting season . . . .”203
199 Orion, 68 Va. Cir. at 202.
200 See VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
201 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 at 18, Orion, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (No. 04-0019) (testimony of Fred
Boger).
202 1 Transcript of Trial at 143–44, Orion, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (No. 04-0019).
203 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 at 40-41, Orion, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (No. 04-0019).
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The constitutional guarantee includes the proviso that the right to hunt is “subject
only to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by
general law.”204  This negates any local power to regulate the right.  Indeed, the declara-
tion of the right to hunt with this proviso squarely prohibits local regulation.205
The legislative history of the amendment demonstrates the rejection of any local
power to restrict the right to hunt.  Senator William Mims moved to insert “allowing
regulation as any city or town may prescribe by charter” at the end.  As reworded by
Mims, the amendment would have stated: “The people have a right to hunt and fish,
subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by
general law and any city or town may prescribe by charter.”206  The Senate rejected the
amendment.207  The proviso that the right is subject to regulation only by the General
Assembly was carefully chosen to prohibit restrictions based on local ordinances or
local land use decisions.208
Where counties have no power to pass ordinances restricting certain activities,
restricting the same activities through land-use decisions cannot be considered reason-
able exercises of the county’s police power.  “In determining the constitutional scope
of the zoning police power delegated to local governments in Virginia, we look first
to our own enabling statutes.”209  The Virginia Court of Appeals has explained:
In Virginia, the boards of supervisors of the counties do not have
broad general authority to adopt whatever ordinance they deem
appropriate or desirable.  The power of a county, like that of a
municipal corporation, is controlled by Dillon’s Rule, which autho-
rizes the locality to exercise those powers or adopt ordinances that
the legislature expressly authorizes by statute or that are conferred
by necessary implication.210
The General Assembly has authorized counties to pass ordinances to prohibit hunt-
ing only pursuant to strict criteria.  Hunting may be prohibited in or within one-half
204 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4. Even before ratification of the amendment, it was held that
“absent specific authority to the contrary, county boards of supervisors are not authorized to
pass ordinances regulating hunting.” 1993 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 157, 2 n.1 (determining that the
locality may not prohibit bow hunting on private property).
205 “The proviso . . . is generally intended to restrain the enacting clause, and to except some-
thing which would otherwise have been within it, or in some measure to modify the enacting
clause.” Commonwealth v. Ford, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 683, 688 (1878) (citation omitted).
206 See HJ124, Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information System, http://leg1
.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+amd+HJ124ASR (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
207 Id.
208 Compare id. with H.R.J. Res 124, 2000 Leg., 504th Sess. (Va. 2000).
209 Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199, 208 (Va. 1975).
210 Lawless v. County of Chesterfield, 465 S.E.2d 153, 154 (Va. App. 1995).
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mile of a subdivision or other heavily populated area if it would be dangerous.211 
Hunting may be prohibited on or within 100 yards of a highway,212 school, or park.213 
A county may prohibit hunting with a shotgun loaded with slugs or a rifle larger than
.22 caliber rimfire.214  A county has no authority to prohibit hunting with a shotgun
loaded with shot, which is used in sporting clays.
Similarly, the General Assembly has authorized counties to pass ordinances to
prohibit the discharge of firearms only pursuant to clearly defined criteria.  A county
may prohibit the shooting of firearms in areas of the county which are “so heavily
populated as to make such conduct dangerous to the inhabitants thereof.”215  A county
may not circumvent this provision through a land use decision rather than an ordi-
nance,216 by prohibiting shooting of firearms in areas which are not so populated as
to make shooting dangerous to the inhabitants.217
The General Assembly has also preempted localities from adopting any ordinance
or taking any action governing the purchase, possession, transfer, ownership, carrying
or transporting of firearms or ammunition except as expressly authorized by statute.218 
Even aside from preemption statutes, localities do not have power to regulate firearms
211 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1210 (2008).
212 VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-526.
213 § 29.1-527.
214 § 29.1-528(A).
215 § 15.2-1209. Section 15.2-1209 provides:
Any county may prohibit the shooting of firearms . . . in any areas
of the county which are in the opinion of the governing body so heavily
populated as to make such conduct dangerous to the inhabitants thereof.
. . . .
Any county that prohibits the outdoor shooting of firearms . . . shall
provide an exemption for the killing of deer pursuant to § 29.1-529. Such
exemption for the shooting of firearms shall apply on land of at least five
acres that is zoned for agricultural use.
216 Similar policies are explained in Duff v. Twp. of Northhampton, 532 A.2d 500, 507 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987), aff’d, 550 A.2d 1319 (Pa. 1988), as follows:
The problem of hunting wild game with weapons must be uniform and
comprehensive, else chaos, confusion and danger to the public would
result. . . . To permit each municipality to pass its own version of the
Game Law would prevent the Game Commission from freely utilizing
its experienced decision-making powers in determining the appropriate
balance between the rights of hunters to hunt, the control of wild game
and the safety of the citizens of this Commonwealth.
See also Kaluszka v. Town of E. Hartford, 760 A.2d 1282 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (ordi-
nance permitting police chief to close area to hunting preempted by state hunting statutes).
217 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199, 212 (Va. 1975) (“Nor is there any
evidence that such uses are noxious, dangerous, or otherwise inimical to the public health,
safety, or welfare.”).
218 § 15.2-915.
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use absent specific authority.  The Virginia Attorney General has summarized the
familiar rules as follows:
Virginia follows the Dillon rule of strict construction concern-
ing the powers of local governing bodies.  Under that rule of
construction, local governing bodies have only those powers that
are expressly granted, those that are necessarily or fairly implied
from expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and
indispensable.
. . . [W]hen a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the
authority exists only to the extent specifically granted in the stat-
ute.  The mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion
of another.219
Applying the above rules, Attorney General opinions have consistently opined
that local regulation of firearms is invalid unless explicitly authorized.220  In short, if
a county is not empowered to pass an ordinance prohibiting certain activity, it may
not achieve the same result through a land-use decision.
B. A County May Not Restrict the Right to Hunt For Other Constitutionally
Impermissible Reasons
Shooting facilities may be opposed based on the objection of neighbors citing
various reasons; noise considerations, lead pollution, safety, and simple dislike of
activities involving firearms.  They may say that shooters should go someplace else
to practice and pursue their sport.  However, where noise ordinances are not being
violated, environmental standards are being met, safety is not an issue, and the area
is rural or otherwise consistent with such use, a shooting facility should not be pro-
hibited.  Not only is shooting an essential aspect of the right to hunt and pursue
game as well as the right to keep and bear arms, restrictions thereon must not be
based on constitutionally impermissible reasons.
The “negative attitude of the majority of property owners” is not a legitimate
reason to deny a zoning permit.221  “[D]enial of [a] permit [is] arbitrary [where] the
decision to deny was not related to any substantial zoning interest, but was instead
motivated principally [by] the heavy opposition of neighbors [expressed] at [a]
219 1998 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 56, 1 (citations omitted).
220 Id. (locality may require concealed handgun applicant to be fingerprinted only if it adopts
ordinance, which was authorized by statute); 1982 Op. Va. Att’y. Gen. 163 (absent express
grant, county may not prohibit carrying of a loaded firearm); 1983 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 755
(absent grant, locality may not require a permit for purchase of handgun).
221 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
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public hearing.”222  Zoning officials may not rely “on public distaste for certain
activities . . . .”223
In making zoning decisions, counties must be cognizant of and respect consti-
tutional rights.  “As the Board says, the police power is ‘elastic.’  But its stretch is
not infinite.  If it were, no property right, indeed, no personal right, could co-exist
with it.”224
In Orion, although the Estate complied with the county noise ordinance, noise
was the reason given by the Board for its denial of the permit.225  One neighbor testi-
fied that he is opposed to ever hearing any gunshot sound.226
A reasonable level of sound is inherent in the constitutional rights to hunt and to
keep and bear arms, as both necessarily involve the discharge of firearms at targets,
whether game or non-game.  A right may not be suppressed because someone objects
to a characteristic inherent in the exercise of the right.227
As the U.S. Supreme Court asked in a First Amendment case, must a person’s
ability to use a sound truck “depend on the whim or caprice of the Chief of Police,”
and on his ability to “prove to the satisfaction of that official that his noise will not
be annoying to people?”228  To the contrary, “Noise can be regulated by regulating
decibels” and “by narrowly drawn statutes.”229
A permit to conduct a constitutionally protected activity cannot be denied because
the right might be exercised someplace else.  As held in an analogous situation, “one
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”230  In Orion, the Estate sat on
a rural 450 acres zoned agricultural, in Nelson County—one of Virginia’s most rural
counties which is renowned for hunting.231  The sporting clays facility was essentially
banned from the entire county.
222 Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311 n.3 (4th Cir. 1989) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
223 Id. (quoting Bayou Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1977).
224 Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199, 209 (Va. 1975).
225 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2N at 5–6, Orion Sporting Group v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir.
195, 195 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) (No. 04-0019) (citing Transcript of the Board of Supervisors
Meeting, Feb. 4, 2004, at 18–23, 29).
226 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1A, Orion, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (No. 04-0019) (citing Transcript of
Planning Committee Meeting, Nov. 19, 2003, at 50).
227 Prior to 2009, Virginia did not encourage noise reduction for firearms. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-308.6 (2008) (repealed) (felony to possess unregistered firearm muffler or silencer).
228 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561–62 (1948).
229 Id. at 562.
230 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
231 Shooting facilities have been upheld on far smaller tracts. See, e.g., Oak Haven Trailer
Court, Inc. v. W. Wayne Defendant Conservation Ass’n, 141 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. 1966) (a 62-
acre tract with shooting facilities, zoned agricultural with the community surrounding the gun
club not highly developed, in an area in which deer hunting was carried on in season—gun club
clearly appropriate); Evergreen State Builders, Inc. v. Pierce, 516 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1973) 
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In sum, given the proviso that the right to hunt is “subject only to such regulations
and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law,”232 a locality
may not relegate to itself the power to define to what extent shooting activities consti-
tute “hunting” and are or are not allowed.  Recognition of the activity of sighting in
a gun as a hunting activity only at the beginning of the hunting season is beyond the
purview of a locality.
CONCLUSION
The definitive precedent on the nature of the emerging constitutional right to hunt
has yet to be written in any State.  Indeed, virtually no court at any level has so much
as opined on the issue, due perhaps to the recency of adoption of the guarantees and
the lack of any legislative onslaught against hunting in the States that have guarantees. 
The single exception is Vermont, which has recognized the liberty to hunt since 1777233
and whose highest court has had occasion to speak to the issue.234  States without such
guarantees are perhaps most likely to ban hunting, or at least specific kinds of hunting,
based on reasons that some may allegedly arise out of politically correct, “Bambi”
view of nature.235
At least in those States where hunting is or may become a constitutional right, it
remains to be seen to what extent the right will be taken seriously by the courts.  The
guarantees themselves explicitly recognize the legitimacy of general regulation of
hunting pursuant to State law, including delegation of regulation to game and fish
commissions and departments.  What is certain is that animal rights activists and other
opponents of hunting will continue to pursue their agendas, and localities will occasion-
ally overreach by prohibiting hunting or activities like shooting that promote profi-
ciency, safety, and humaneness.  In the inevitable courtroom conflicts, eventually a
jurisprudence of the right to hunt will evolve.
(70-acre wooded tract with shooting facilities in an area that, over the years, had become a
suburban residential zone—urbanization of society should not be permitted to destroy such
kinds of recreation).
232 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
233 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 2, § 39.
234 See Cabot v. Thomas, 514 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Vt. 1986) (hunt guarantee “offers a general
delineation of not only the respective rights of landowners and sportsmen but also the authority
of government to regulate those rights in the context of hunting and fishing”); State v. Norton,
45 Vt. 258 (1872) (“The numerous statutes which have been passed for the protection of game
and fish have been deemed necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the constitutional right.”).
235 See New Jersey Animal Rights Alliance v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 934 A.2d
52 (N.J. 2007) (animal rights groups challenged black bear management policy by the
Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Fish and Wildlife,
after which the Commissioner withdrew her approval of the policy; sportsmen clubs challenged
the withdrawal, but court invalidated the original policy).
APPENDIX: 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS GUARANTEEING THE RIGHT TO HUNT
The following States have constitutional guarantees of the right to hunt or have
amendments pending to do so.
Alabama:  ALA. CONST. amend. 597 (adopted in 1996)
All persons shall have the right to hunt and fish in this state in accordance with
laws and regulations.
Arkansas:  Language that will be on the 2010 General Election Ballot:
SECTION 1.
(a)(1) Citizens of the state of Arkansas have a right to hunt, fish, trap, and harvest
wildlife.
(2) The right to hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife shall be subject only to
regulations that promote sound wildlife conservation and management and are con-
sistent with Amendment 35 of the Arkansas Constitution.
(b) Public hunting, fishing, and trapping shall be a preferred means of managing
and controlling nonthreatened species and citizens may use traditional methods for
harvesting wildlife.
(c) Nothing in this amendment shall be construed to alter, repeal, or modify:
(1) Any provision of Amendment 35 to the Arkansas Constitution;
(2) Any common law or statute relating to trespass, private property rights,
eminent domain, public ownership of property, or any law concerning firearms un-
related to hunting; or
(3) The sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas.
Georgia:  GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XXVIII (adopted in 2006)
The tradition of fishing and hunting and the taking of fish and wildlife shall be pre-
served for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good.
Louisiana:  LA. CONST. art I, § 27 (adopted in 2004)
The freedom to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife, including all aquatic life, traditionally
taken by hunters, trappers and anglers, is a valued natural heritage that shall be forever
preserved for the people.  Hunting, fishing and trapping shall be managed by law and
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regulation consistent with Article IX, Section I of the Constitution of Louisiana to pro-
tect, conserve and replenish the natural resources of the state.  The provisions of this
Section shall not alter the burden of proof requirements otherwise established by law
for any challenge to a law or regulation pertaining to hunting, fishing or trapping the
wildlife of the state, including all aquatic life.  Nothing contained herein shall be con-
strued to authorize the use of private property to hunt, fish, or trap without the consent
of the owner of the property.
Minnesota:  MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12 (adopted in 1999)
Hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our
heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people and shall be managed by law
and regulation for the public good.
Montana:  MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 7
Preservation of Harvest Heritage.  The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild
game animals is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual citizens of
the state and does not create a right to trespass on private property or diminution of
other private rights.
North Dakota:  N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27 (adopted in 2000)
Hunting, trapping, and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part
of our heritage and will be forever preserved for the people and managed by law and
regulation for the public good.
Oklahoma:  OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 36 (adopted in 2008)
All citizens of this state shall have a right to hunt, fish, trap and harvest game and
fish, subject only to reasonable regulation as prescribed by the Legislature and the
Wildlife Conservation Commission.  The Wildlife Conservation Commission shall
have the power and authority to approve methods, practices and procedures for hunt-
ing, trapping, fishing and the taking of game and fish.  Traditional methods, practices
and procedures shall be allowed for taking game and fish that are not identified as
threatened by law or by the Commission.  Hunting, fishing and trapping shall be the
preferred means of managing game and fish that are not identified as threatened by
law or by the Commission.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify any
provision of common law or statutes relating to trespass, eminent domain, or any other
property rights.
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South Carolina:  Language that will be on the 2010 General Election Ballot in
South Carolina:
Section 25.  The traditions of hunting and fishing are valuable parts of the state’s
heritage, important for conservation, and a protected means of managing nonthreatened
wildlife.  The citizens of this State have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife
traditionally pursued, subject to laws and regulations promoting sound wildlife con-
servation and management as prescribed by the General Assembly.  Nothing in this
section shall be construed to abrogate any private property rights, existing state laws
or regulations, or the state’s sovereignty over its natural resources.
Tennessee: Passed the legislature in 2008, must pass again in 2010 to be on the
2010 Ballot.
The citizens of this state shall have the personal right to hunt and fish, subject to
reasonable regulations and restrictions prescribed by law.  The recognition of this right
does not abrogate any private or public property rights, nor does it limit the state’s
power to regulate commercial activity.  Traditional manners and means may be used
to take non-threatened species.
Vermont: VT. CONST. ch. II, § XXXIX (adopted in 1777)
Hunting, fowling and fishing.  The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in
seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not en-
closed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private property)
under proper regulations, to be made and provided by the General Assembly.
Virginia: VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (adopted in 2000)
Right of the people to hunt, fish, and harvest game.  The people have a right to
hunt, fish, and harvest game, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General
Assembly may prescribe by general law.
Wisconsin: WIS. CONST. art. I, § 26 (adopted in 2003)
Right to Fish, Hunt, Trap, and Take Game.  The people have the right to fish,
hunt, trap, and take game subject only to reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law.
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RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS TO HUNT
Delaware:  DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (adopted in 1987)
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home
and State, and for hunting and recreational use.
Nebraska:  NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1 (adopted in 1988)
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and in-
alienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right
to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for
lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and
such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof.  To
secure these rights, and the protection of property, governments are instituted among
people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
Nevada:  NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11, cl. 1 (adopted in 1982)
Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for
lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes.
New Mexico:  N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 6 (adopted in 1971, amended in 1986)
No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security
and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes,
but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.  No
municipality or county shall regulate, in any way, an incident of the right to keep and
bear arms.
North Dakota:  N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 (adopted in 1984)
All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have certain in-
alienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty;
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person, family,
property, and the state, and for lawful hunting, recreational, and other lawful purposes,
which shall not be infringed.
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West Virginia:  W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 22 (adopted in 1986)
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home
and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use.236
Wisconsin:  WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (adopted in 1998)
The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting,
recreation or any other lawful purpose.
236 In addition, W. VA. CONST. article VI, § 55, provides in part:
Revenues and properties applicable to fish and wildlife conservation. . . .
Nothing in this section shall prevent the Legislature from reducing or
increasing the amount of any permit or license to hunt, trap, fish or other-
wise hold or capture fish or wildlife or to repeal or enact additional fees
or requirements for the privilege of hunting, trapping, fishing or to
otherwise hold or capture fish or wildlife.
